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Rounsborg: Statutes - Retroactive Application of the 1980 Wyoming Probate Co

STATUTES-Retroactive Application of the 1980 Wyoming Probate
Code. Douglas v. Newell, 719 P.2d 971 (Wyo. 1986).
Elizabeth Newell executed her final will in 1969 in Mitchell, Nebraska.
In Article II of her will, Mrs. Newell devised all her real estate to her husband if he survived her. That provision, however, excluded any interest
she owned in a portion of real estate located in Converse County, Wyoming. If Mrs. Newell's husband predeceased her, which he did, then Article III of the will devised all her property to a testamentary trust. Article
III failed to exclude the Converse County property. Article X of the will
devised the Converse County property to two nieces and two nephews.1
In 1980, Mrs. Newell and the owners of the remaining interests in the
Converse County property sold the property on a contract for deed. Mrs.
Newell died in 1982 with three annual payments remaining on the
contract.2
Two nieces and a nephew of Mrs. Newell named in Article X brought
an action for a declaratory judgment. The nieces and nephews alleged that
the devise of the Converse County property did not adeem when Mrs.
Newell sold the property.' The beneficiaries of the testamentary trust contended that Article X lapsed when Mr. Newell died.4 The beneficiaries further argued that, if Article X did not lapse, then Mrs. Newell intended
the devise to adeem when she sold the property.' The trial court ruled
that Article X did not lapse upon Mr. Newell's death, and that the devise
contained in Article X adeemed.' The court's holding gave the trust the
remaining payments from the sale.
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
ruling that Article X of Mrs. Newell's will did not lapse when her husband died.7 The court then reversed the trial court on the question of
ademption. The court refused to adopt the doctrine of ademption by extinction.8 The court also held that the 1980 Wyoming Probate Code applies
to wills executed before the effective date of the Code, when the date of
the testator's death is after the Code's effective date. The court stated
that the code would apply retroactively unless such an application would
1. Douglas v. Newell, 719 P.2d 971, 972 (Wyo. 1986).
2. Id
3. ld A devise of specific property adeems when the testator's ownership of the
property is extinguished during the testator's lifetime. In re Estate of McClow, 290 N.W.2d
186, 188 (Neb. 1980). (Adeem means to remove or take away a gift by will prior to death.
Woodburn Lodge No. 102, I.O.O.F. v. Wilson, 148 Or. 150, 34 P.2d 611, 614 (1934)1.
4. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 972-73. Mrs. Newell's grandsons argued that Article X was
an exception to the devise of property to Mrs. Newell's husband contained in Article II,
but not to the devise of property to the trust contained in Article III. They argued that
Article X of the will expired with Article II upon Mr. Newell's death. Brief of Appellants
at 14-15, Douglas v. Newell 719 P.2d 971 (Wyo. 1986) (No. 85-106).
5. Brief of Appellees at 29, Douglas v. Newell, 719 P.2d 971 (Wyo. 1986) (No. 85-105).
6. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 972.
7. Id
8. Id at 975.
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adversely affect existing vested rights.9 Thus, the court held that, under
the 1980 Code, the remaining balance due on the contract passed to Mrs.
Newell's nieces and nephews under Article X.'
This casenote focuses on the retroactive application of the 1980 Wyoming Probate Code. The Wyoming Supreme Court retroactively applied
the Code without the required statutory authorization. The court's holding disregarded Mrs. Newell's right to rely on the laws in existence at
the time she executed her will.
BACKGROUND

Wyoming grants legally competent individuals an "absolute right"
to dispose of their property at death by will.'" If a will is clear and unambiguous, a court will not look beyond the language of the will to determine the testator's intent.
If, however, a testator's intent is not clear, a court will use rules of
construction to determine the testator's intent and give it effect." Courts
developed these rules of construction to give effect to the intent of the
average testator. 4 Some states have codified and changed rules of construction in efforts to modernize probate law. 6 In addition to using rules
of construction, courts also consider surrounding circumstances when
determining a testator's intent.'6
The 1980 Wyoming Probate Code
The legislature enacted the 1980 Probate Code to modernize Wyoming
probate law.' 7 The Code stated that its effective date was in 1980 and that
its procedures would apply to all probate proceedings brought after the
effective date.' 8
9. Id at 980. In holding that the Probate Code provisions apply to all wills where the
date of death is after the effective date of the Code, the court relied on WYo. STAT. § 2-1-102(d)
(1977, Rev. 1980), which states: "The procedure herein prescribed shall govern all proceedings in probate brought after the effective date of this code."
10. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 982. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-109(b)(i) (1977, Rev. 1980) provides: "(b)
A specific devisee has the right to the remaining specifically devised property, and: (i) Any
balance of the purchase price together with any security interest owing from a purchaser
to the testator at death by reason of sale of the property."
11. In re Lane's Estate, 50 Wyo. 119, 135, 58 P.2d 415, 419 (1936). The Wyoming Probate Code explicitly recognizes that right. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-101 (1977, Rev. 1980) provides:
Any person of legal age and sound mind may make a will and dispose of all
his property by will except what is sufficient to pay his debts, and subject to
the rights of the surviving spouse and children.
That right must, however, be exercised in accordance with the law. In re Lane's Estate, 50
Wyo. at 135, 58 P.2d at 419.
12. Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79, 81 (Wyo. 1983); Churchfield v. First Nat. Bank
of Sheridan, 418 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Wyo. 1966).
13. 4 PAGE, WILLS (Bowe-Parker Revision 1961) § 30.4 at 12, 13.
14. Id at 15.
15. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. §§ 2-1-101 to 2-1-405 (1977, Rev. 1980).
16. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Wyo. v. Finkbiner, 416 P.2d 224 (Wyo. 1966).
17. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 974-75.
18. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-102(d) (1977, Rev. 1980) provides: "The procedure herein prescribed
shall govern all proceedings in probate brought after the effective date of this code." The
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The 1980 Probate Code attempts to modernize and clarify the rules
of will construction.19 The Code, however, recognizes that the testator's
intent "controls the legal effect of his dispositions,"2 0 and the statutory
rules of construction apply to the extent they effectuate that intent. If
the Code does not address specific construction problems, the common
law rules of construction apply.1
The common law rule of ademption by extinction is one rule of construction addressed by the Code. At common law, ademption by extinction is a "rule of construction that, when a specifically devised item of
property is not part of the testator's estate at the time of his or her death,
holds the devise fails."22 The 1980 Wyoming Probate Code contains a
nonademption provision that gives the specific devisee a right to:
(1) Unpaid owing balance of the purchase price; (2) Unpaid amount
of a condemnation award; (3) Unpaid fire and casualty insurance
proceeds; or (4 Property received by foreclosure or obtained in
lieu of foreclosure on a specifically devised obligation. 1
Thus, if a testator sells property and dies before he receives the entire
purchase price, the devisees of the property will receive the unpaid sale
proceeds."'
Retroactive Application of Statutes
In Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,"5 the Wyoming Supreme Court
stated that retroactive applications of statutes are disfavored and permissible only upon clear direction of the legislature.1 In Johnson,the plaintiff in a personal injury action requested an instruction explaining the
effect of a percentage verdict on the plaintiff's right to recover. The trial
court refused to give this instruction," and entered judgment for the defenlegislature developed the Code from Iowa's Probate Code and the Uniform Probate Code.
Averill, The Wyoming ProbateCode of 1980: An Analysis and Critique,16 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 103, 108 (1981). Before 1980, Wyoming probate law was based on California statutes, and the Wyoming Supreme Court used California case law when interpreting the prior
law. Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court has not stated that it will give special consideration
to Iowa court decisions when interpreting the 1980 Wyoming Probate Code. The Douglas
court however, cited an Iowa case that addressed testator's intent. 719 P.2d at 976 (citing
Newbury v. McCammant, 182 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1970)). Therefore, Iowa law may provide
guidance for interpreting provision of Wyoming's current Probate Code.
19. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. §§ 2-7-808 (Abatement); 2-6-106 (Anti-Lapse); Averill, supra
note 18, at 135-40.
20. WYO. STAT. § 2-6-105 (1977, Rev. 1980).
21. In the absence of statutory provisions, Wyoming adopts the common law. Druley
v. Houdesheldt, 75 Wyo. 155, 159, 294 P.2d 351, 352 (1956).
22. Averill, supra note 18, at 133.
23. Id at 134 (interpreting Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-109, supra note 10). Averill notes that
Wyoming's nonademption statute is a modification of the Uniform Probate Code's nonademption provision. Averill, supra note 19, at 133 n.119.
24. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-109(b) (1977, Rev. 1980). A specific devise is a devise of specific
property in a testator's estate, and a specific devisee is the intended beneficiary of the specific
property. In re Estate of Deutsch, 644 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1982).
25. 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 1977).
26. Id at 912-13.
27. Id at 909.
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dant.29 The plaintiff appealed, and argued that a 1976 statute required
the court to use the instruction in the plaintiff's suit. The Wyoming
Supreme Court held that use of the instruction would be an improper
retroactive application of the statute because the statute did not clearly
call for such an application. 9
The Wyoming Supreme Court has also discussed retroactive applica30
tion of statutes in other contexts. For example, in Application of Hagood,
the Wyoming Supreme Court held that it will not apply statutes retroactively when such application will interfere with contracting parties' rights.
The court stated the well established rule that laws in existence at the
time and place of the agreement are incorporated into the contract as if
expressly included. 1
In that case, however, the court stated that the leases, as amended
and re-executed, were essentially new leases that did not contain preferential rights. Therefore, application of the statute
to the leases did not con32
stitute an improper retroactive application.
When a legislature enacts a new probate code, courts must decide
whether to apply the code prospectively or retroactively. Whether a court
should retroactively apply a probate statute is a difficult question because,
prior to a testator's death, heirs and beneficiaries have no vested rights
in the testator's property.33 The court in Douglas took the position that
since changes in probate law do not affect any rights of heirs or beneficiaries prior to a testator's death, application of the new law is not retroactive. 4 The Ohio case of Parrettv. PaulP5 stated that because a will speaks
from the testator's death, it is the law in effect at that time which controls the rights of the devisees. 6 Prior to Douglas,the Wyoming Supreme
Court had not decided what law applied in determining a testator's intent.
Since Wyoming had not addressed the issue of the retroactive application of probate statutes before Douglas, case law from other jurisdictions provides guidance. Several follow the principle that, in determining
a testator's intent, the law in existence at the time of the will's execution
is controlling."
28. cl.at 909-10.
29. Id at 914.
30. 356 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1960).
31. Id at 138.
32. Id. at 139. In that case, Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Company secured leases of certain state lands in 1947. In 1951, these leases were amended. Before the leases expired, the
company applied for new leases. Hagood also applied for leases to the lands. The Commissioner of Public Lands granted the leases to the company solely on the basis of preferential
rights to prior lease holders. Id at 136. Hagood appealed because the legislature had abolished
the preferential rights practice in 1951. Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the 1951
changes to the law removed the authority to grant leases based on preferential rights before
the 1951 lease amendments. The court stated that a statute may not apply retroactively
if such application will deprive parties of rights contained in a contract. Id at 138.
33. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 979-80.
34. Id. at 977-78.
35. 115 Ohio App. 488, 185 N.E.2d 798 (1962).
36. 185 N.E.2d at 799-800.
37. 4 PAGE, supra note 13, § 30.26 at 166 n.1.
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The Court of Appeals of Ohio cited this proposition with approval in
Brouse v. Old Phoenix Nat. Bank of Medina."' In Brouse, the testator
executed his will in 1979. In his will, it was argued, he attempted to exercise his power of appointment. Prior to the testator's death, the Ohio legislature changed the requirements for the exercise of the power of
appointment." In determining whether the testator had exercised his
power of appointment, the Ohio court relied on rules of construction. The
court applied the law in existence at the time of the will's execution, and
determined that the testator had intended to exercise his power.4 In its
holding, the Ohio court stated that it presumed that a testator, in exercising his right to make a will,
knows of the existing law and therefore
1
drafts his will accordingly.4
The Colorado Court of Appeals also stated that the law in existence
at the time of the execution of a will controls a testator's intent, in Matter of Estate of Daigle.42 That court held that the trial court erred by using
a rule of construction in existence at the testator's death when a different rule
of construction was in existence when the testator executed his
43
will.

In Rieck v.Rieck,"I the Colorado Court of Appeals stated that "[tlestators are charged with knowledge of the ...[law] in existence at the time
5
...their wills are made.' 4 Colorado's probate code, like Wyoming's, is
of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC).46
provisions
the
to
very similar
Oklahoma takes a similar position. In Crump's Estate v. Freeman,47
that state's supreme court said that the law in existence at the execution
of a will is incorporated into the will. In Oklahoma, the courts will assume
that a testator knew the applicable law at the time and place of the will's
execution."
In Illinois, the courts also assume that a testator knew the law at the
time he executed his will. According to In re Estate of Hughlett,'9 that
law is a circumstance that courts consider when ascertaining a testator's
intent.5 0
Likewise, the Court of Chancery of Delaware, in Reynolds v. Russel1
stated the general rule in Delaware that, in determining a testator's intent,
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

11 Ohio App. 3d 9, 495 N.E.2d 42, 44-45 (1985).
495 N.E.2d at 43 (syllabus by the court).
Id at 45.
Id at 44.
642 P.2d 527, 528 (Colo. App. 1982).
Id
724 P.2d 674 (Colo. App. 1986).
Id at 676-77.
Id at 676.
614 P.2d 1096 (Okla. 1980).
Id at 1099.
113 Ill.
App. 3d 910, 446 N.E.2d 887 (1983).
Id 446 N.E.2d at 890.
433 A.2d 699 (Del. Ch. 1981).
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the law in existence at the time of execution governs, unless the will indicates a contrary intent.62
Other courts have considered the law in existence at a testator's death
when construing will provisions. In Riggs Nat.Bank of Washington, D.C.
v. Surnmerlin,5 the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, looked to the law in existence both at the time the testator
executed his will and at the time of the testator's death to determine his
intent.5 4 In that case, the court stated that the law in existence at a testator's death is the law used to determine the testator's intent." However,
the court further stated that the law "in existence at the time of his death
6
... is the very latest that can apply." (emphasis added) The court stated
that it cannot apply law enacted after a testator's death to ascertain or
affect the intent of the testator. The court reasoned "that the testator
cannot be presumed
to have acted upon the basis of law not yet in being
67
when he died."
One court has applied the law in existence at the testator's death
without any reference to the law in existence at the execution of a will.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, a state whose probate code is based on
the UPC, used the law in existence at the testator's date of death in Matter of Estate of Christian.8 That case involved a change in the rules of
will construction after the testator's date of death.59 The Hawaii court
did not address the testator's rights, but rather the heirs' rights, and
stated that the new "anti-lapse provision could not be given retroactive
application absent clear direction. '"60
Iowa, whose code provided a partial basis for the 1980 Wyoming Probate Code,"' followed the same position in Matter of Estate of Duhme."
In that case, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that changes in the rules
of construction after a testator's death may not affect the vested rights
of beneficiaries. 3
As the survey of state case law illustrates, the law is inconsistent on
the question of what law applies when the legislature changes the rules
of will construction between the execution of a will and the testator's
death. Generally, courts apply the law in existence at the testator's death
when there is a need to protect beneficiaries' rights. This happens when
changes in law occur after a testator's date of death. When the change
52. Id. at 702.
53. 445 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971).
54. Id at 208.
55. Id

56. Id (citing American Sec. &Trust Co. v. Cramer, 175 F. Supp. 367, 370 (D.D.C. 1959)).
57. Riggs Nat. Bank, 445 F.2d at 208.
58. 65 Haw. 394, 652 P.2d 1137 (1982).

59. 652 P.2d at 1140.
60. Id at 1141.
61. Averill, supra note 18, at 133 n.119.
62. 267 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa 1978).
63. Id at 691. For a case where a change in a rule of will construction was used to determine testator's intent, when the change was after execution of the will, but before the testator's death, see In re Estate of Leavy, 122 N.H. 184, 442 A.2d 588 (1982).
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in law occurs between the execution of the will and the testator's date
of death, courts generally look to the law that existed when the testator
drafted his will. Prior to Douglas, the Wyoming Supreme Court had not
addressed this question.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

In Douglas, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that application of the
1980 Wyoming Probate Code to a will executed prior to the Code's effective date was not an improper retroactive application. 64 The court first
addressed whether Article X of Mrs. Newell's will, devising the Converse
County property to her nieces and nephews, lapsed upon the death of Mr.
Newell. A unanimous court held that it did not. The court noted that Article X of the will was a specific devise, and that Article III was a general
6
devise.65 Consistent with its holding in In re Lendecke's Estate,"
the
court
7
devise.
general
the
over
held that the specific devise prevailed
The court then held that the specific devise of the Converse County
property did not adeem upon the contract sale of the property in 1980.
The contract balance remaining at Mrs. Newell's death passed under Article X to her nieces and nephews.6 8 The court refused to judicially adopt

the common law doctrine of ademption by extinction. The court stated
that the legislature had acted before ademption became a part of Wyoming law, and that it would not retroactively recognize "a discredited and
legislatively repealed rule." 9
The court then discussed the appropriateness of the common law rule
of ademption. The court stated that actual intent, rather than a mechanical rule, should control the disposition of a testator's property. The
mechanical rule, the court said, was irrelevant when determining whether
a testator intended a devisee take something in substitution for specifically devised property.70 The court further stated that more often than
64. Douglas v. Newell, 719 P.2d at 980.
65. Id at 973.
66. 79 Wyo. 27, 329 P.2d 819 (1958).
67. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 973.
68. Id. at 982. The court refused to apply the doctrine of equitable conversion, where
the purchaser of property on a contract acquires equitable title to the property, to support
the contention that the devise had been estinguished by the sale, by recognizing Mrs. Newell's
continued interest in the property. The court felt it was also significant that in Article X
of her will, Mrs. Newell devised "all... interest and title" in the Converse County property,
not just the property itself. Id at 980. The court stated that the devise of all "interest and
title" indicated Mrs. Newell's intent, the controlling factor in determining the effect of her
dispositions under Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-105 (1977, Rev. 1980), and was consistent with the holding
that the balance of the purchase price would pass to her nieces and nephews by way of Wyo.
STAT. § 2-6-109 (1977, Rev. 1980). Douglas, 719 P.2d at 982. A Nebraska attorney prepared
Mrs. Newell's will and the will was executed in Nebraska. The land involved in the dispute
was located in Wyoming. This raised the question of which state's law to apply. As Nebraska
had adopted the Uniform Probate Code, with identical nonademption provisions as the 1980
Wyoming Probate Code, the court held that application of either state's law would render
the same result. Id. at 981.
69. Id at 976.
70. Id at 976 (citing Note, Ademption and the Testator's Intent, 74 HARV. L. REV.
741, 750 (1961)).
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not, application of the common law rule produced a result contrary to the
testator's true intent.'
The court then held that, pursuant to Wyoming Statute section
2-1-102(d),2 the Probate Code would apply to all wills where the testator
dies after the Code's effective date. 3 This application of the statute supported the court's holding on the issue of ademption, because Wyoming
Statute section 2-6-1091" provides any unpaid sale proceeds at a testator's
death pass to the devisees of specific property when the property has been
sold prior to the testator's death.
The court stated that retroactive application of statutes was not an
issue because the Probate Code specifically requires application of the current code provisions.7" The court stated that if Mrs. Newell, or any other
testator, had wanted ademption to occur, she could have expressed this
desire in her will at execution or by amendment.76 The court also stated
that its holding would not adversely affect the rights of beneficiaries.77
The court noted that an heir or beneficiary has no enforceable rights until
the death of the testator.78
The court stated that a will speaks from the date of the testator's
death.79 The court also stated that although an heir or beneficiary may
not be divested of rights to property after they have vested, the legislature reserves the power to control wills, the execution of wills, and the
manner in which will provisions are carried out.A0
In dissent, Chief Justice Thomas argued that the court's holding was
inconsistent with Mrs. Newell's intent because Mrs. Newell had a right
to rely on the law in existence at the time of the execution of her will.
Justice Thomas argued that Mrs. Newell would have been properly advised
that if she sold the property,
the gift would adeem, and that this is what
8
Mrs. Newell wanted. 1
71. 719 P.2d at 976 (citing Note, Wills, Ademption and Legacies in Oklahoma, 14 OKLA.
L. REV. 108, 113 (1961); Mecham, Why Not a Modern Wills Act, 33 IOWA L. REV. 501, 515
(1958); and Paulus, Ademption by Extinction, Smiting Lord Thurlow's Ghost, 2 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 195, 227 (1970-71) (citing Note, supra note 70, at 745-46)).
72. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-102(d).
73. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 980.
74. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-109(b)(i).
75. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 979 (applying Wyo. STAT. § 2-1-102).
76. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 980.
77. 1d.
78. Id. at 979.
79. Id at 978 (citing Strand v. Stewart, 51 Wash. 685, 99 P. 1027 (1909)).
80. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 978.
81. Id at 982 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Thomas stated that it was Mrs.
Newell's intent that the proceeds from the Converse County property would become part
of the trust. In Thomas' view, allowing the nieces and nephews to collect the unpaid sale
proceeds was inconsistent with the clear intent of the testator which was to provide for her
grandsons by way of the trust. The one exception was for the Converse County lands. Mrs.
Newell devised these lands to her nieces and nephews only "to preserve the Read lands as
a family ranch," and when the property was sold, no purpose in providing for her nieces
and nephews remained. Id
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In his dissent, Justice Rooney pointed out that the effective date of
the code only applies to procedures. 2 In his view, "[t]he statute simply
does not apply to the substantive right of the deceased to make a will
and to adeem a provision thereof before her8 3death in accordance with an

intention formulated under existing law."
ANALYSIS

Retroactive Application of the 1980 Wyoming Probate Code
In Douglas, Justice Urbigkit and the majority said it was Mrs.
Newell's intent that the devisees of the Converse County property receive
the remaining payments due on the sale of the property.84 Justice Thomas
stated that it was Mrs. Newell's intent that the devisees of the property
only receive the land.85 The inevitable conclusion is that Mrs. Newell's
intent was not clear and that the provisions of her will created an abiguity.
courts resort to rules of construction to resolve
When a will is ambiguous,
88
the ambiguity.
The problem in Douglas was that the Wyoming legislature changed
the rules of construction between the time Mrs. Newell executed her will
and the date she died. This raised the question of which rule to apply.
The court's holding disregarded the rules of the retroactive application
of statutes.
In discussing the application of the 1980 Wyoming Probate Code, the
court noted that a retroactive application would not adversely affect any
rights of the beneficiaries, because prior to a testator's death, a beneficiary
has no rights to the testator's property. 81 The court's decision that the
Code applies even if a testator executed a will prior to the effective date
of the Code failed to give adequate consideration to the rights of a testator. This failure resulted in an improper retroactive application of the 1980
Probate Code.
The clear rule in Wyoming is that a statute shall not be applied to
events that occur before the statute's enactment absent clear legislative
direction. 8 The 1980 Wyoming Probate Code provides that "[tihe procedure herein prescribed shall govern all proceedings in probate brought after
the effective date of this code. "88 (emphasis added) The rules of will construction are not procedural, but are substantive provisions of law used
to give effect to a testator's intent.8 0 The Code does not require applica82. Id at 984 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
83. Id

84. Id at 981-82.
Id. at 982 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
4 PAGE, supra note 13, § 30.4 at 14-15.
Douglas, 719 P.2d at 979.
Johnson, 568 P.2d at 914.
89. WYO. STAT. § 2-1-102 (1977, Rev. 1980).

85.
86.
87.
88.

90. The Wyoming Supreme Court has defined substantive law as that which defines
rights while procedural law is the manner in which such rights are exercised and enforced.
Matter of Estate of Boyd, 606 P.2d 1243, 1245 (Wyo. 1980). A court uses the rules of will
construction to define a testator's intent, or the expression of his right to dispose of property
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tion of its substantive provisions to wills where the date of death is after
the Code's effective date and the date of the will's execution is before. 91
The Wyoming Supreme Court has said that a court may not apply changes
in law retroactively without clear direction from the legislature. 92 However,
in Douglas, the court did retroactively apply the substantive provisions
of the 1980 Wyoming Probate Code without the requisite legislative
authorization.
The Wyoming Supreme Court, ignoring its own rules on the retroactive application of statutes, refused to follow the well reasoned rule that
the law in existence when a will is executed controls a testator's intent.
Unfortunately, the Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted literally the
statement of the courts of such states as Iowa and Hawaii, that the law
in existence at a testator's death controls the testator's intent." However,
there is a significant distinction between Douglas and the cases of Iowa
and Hawaii. The Iowa and Hawaii cases discussed the application of rules
of construction that became effective after the testator's death. Douglas
involved changes in the rules of will construction that became effective
before the testator's death. Interestingly, the Iowa and Hawaii cases did
not mention any arguments that the testator's intent would be frustrated
by the application of the new rules. Presumably, such an argument would
have lent even greater support to the holdings of those courts against
retroactive application.
Similarly, in Riggs Nat. Bank," the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals said that the controlling law was the law in existence at the testator's death. Again, the concern was that changes in the law after the testator's death should not affect the vested rights of beneficiaries. In fact,
the court did consider the law in existence at the time of the will's execution in that case, by stating that a court must look to the law in existence
at a will's execution and the testator's death when attempting to determine a testator's intent. The court stressed that it should never look to
laws enacted after those times in construing wills." Like the Riggs Nat.
Bank court, the Wyoming Supreme Court should have considered the law
in existence at the time Mrs. Newell executed her will. Instead, the Wyoming Supreme Court dismissed the law as inapplicable because of its reading of the effective date provision of the 1980 Wyoming Probate Code.
Because Mrs. Newell's intent was not clear, the court should have considered the circumstances surrounding the will.96 Reason would suggest
that one of the most important surrounding circumstances was the "law
through a will, not to provide for the manner in which a testator is allowed to exercise his
right to dispose of property by will. The provisions of Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-6-201 through 2-6-211
are, in contrast, procedural in nature, defining the probate procedure to be used to accomplish the enforcement of the right to dispose of property by will.
91. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 984 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
92. Johnson, 568 P.2d at 913.
93. Matter of Estate of Duhme, 267 N.W.2d 688, 689; Matter of Estate of Christian,

652 P.2d 1137.
94. 445 F.2d 201.
95. Id at 208.
96. Finkbiner,416 P.2d at 229.
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in force at the time the will was executed. 97 It seems anomalous that the
law in existence at the time of the execution of a contract becomes part
of the contract,98 but the law in existence at the time of the execution of
a will does not become part of the will.
If the Wyoming Supreme Court had correctly followed the rules of
retroactive application of statutes in Douglas, then the devise of the Converse County property should have adeemed when Mrs. Newell sold the
lands. The devise should have adeemed despite the court's holding that
ademption does not exist in Wyoming, because that holding was also
wrong.
Ademption
The court said the legislature had determined that the doctrine of
9
ademption by extinction was an inappropriate tool for construing wills. 1
This statement does not accurately represent what the legislature did with
ademption. The 1980 Wyoming Probate Code did not do away with ademption, but merely provided exceptions to the doctrine.'00 One exception is
that ademption will not occur in the case of a sale of property to the extent
that the sales price had not been fully paid to the testator at his or her
death. 1 This was the situation in Douglas. The court failed to recognize,
however, that as a result of its holding, ademption did occur to the extent
of payments received by Mrs. Newell prior to her death."0 '
If the court intended to hold that ademption did not exist as a rule
of construction prior to the enactment of the 1980 Probate Code, and exists
under no circumstances now, then the court ignored the rule of Wyoming
law that, absent statutory provisions to the contrary, the common law
will apply. 03 At the time Mrs. Newell executed her will, ademption was
the common law rule, and Wyoming statutes did not provide otherwise.
Even now ademption exists in Wyoming so long as neither the specifically devised property nor a statutory substitute is found in the testator's estate at death.
CONCLUSION

In Douglas, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the devise of
specific property to Mrs. Newell's nieces and nephews did not adeem upon
97. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 984 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
98. Hagood, 356 P.2d at 138.
99. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 975.
100. WYo. STAT. § 2-6"109 (1977, Rev. 1980) provides that ademption will not occur under
certain circumstances. One such circumstance is when property is not found in an estate
because of a condemnation or fire and the proceeds of the condemnation award or insurance
proceeds are paid to a conservator. Presumably, if a condemnation award or insurance proceeds are paid directly to the testator before death, for condemned or destroyed property
which was the specific object of a devise in the testator's will, ademption will occur.
101. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-109(b)(i).
102. Douglas, 719 P.2d at 983 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The court also stated ademption has never been a part of Wyoming law, yet labels the doctrine "legislatively repealed."
Douglas, 719 P.2d at 976. In what may have been a semantical error, it appears that the
court said that something which has never existed has been repealed.
103. Druley, 294 P.2d at 352.
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the sale of the property. The court stated that ademption is a rule of construction that did not exist in Wyoming and was repealed by the Wyoming legislature with the enactment of the 1980 Wyoming Probate Code.
It then applied the Code to the will that Mrs. Newell executed before the
enactment of the Code.
The court's holding strayed from the well established principle that
a statute adversely affecting enforceable rights will only be applied retroactively upon clear direction of the legislature. The court in Douglasretroactively applied the 1980 Wyoming Probate Code, disregarding Elizabeth
Newell's right to rely on the laws in existence at the time she executed
her will, without a clear directive from the legislature for such an application. As a result of this holding, testators will not be able to rely on the
current provisions of the 1980 Wyoming Probate Code, should the legislature see fit to once again modify the rules of will construction.
WILLIAM
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